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Prize Conclusion

Posted past times Natalie Silvanovich,

On September 13, 2016 nosotros announced the Prize. It concluded final calendar week alongside no prizes awarded. The role of this postal service is to speak over what happened too what nosotros learned close hacking competitor design.
Throughout the contest, nosotros did non have whatever valid entries or bugs (everything nosotros received was either spam, or did non remotely resemble a competitor entry every bit described inward the rules). We did take away heed from around teams too individuals who said they were working on the contest, simply they did non submit whatever bugs or entries. Based on our discussions alongside them, every bit good every bit our full general observations during the contest, nosotros suspect that the next factors led to the lack of entries.

Entry Point Difficulty

It is rare for fully remote Android bugs to survive reported, too it is probable that this was a sticking indicate for participants. The bulk of Android põrnikas chains stimulate alongside around user interaction, specially clicking a link, which was non allowed inward this contest. While this type of põrnikas is non unheard of, it is probable hard to uncovering character bugs inward this area. This way that the timeframe of the competitor or prize sum may non lead maintain been adequate to elicit this type of bug.

Competing Contests

The Prize rules were intended to encourage participants to file partial põrnikas chains inward the Android põrnikas tracker during the contest, fifty-fifty if a total chain was non complete. In designing these rules, nosotros underestimated the impact of other contests on participants’ incentives. The competitor rules allowed for bugs that had already been filed to survive used past times the kickoff filer at whatever indicate during the contest, too have Android Security Rewards if they were non used every bit a business office of a chain.  We expected these rules to encourage participants to file whatever bugs they flora immediately, every bit exclusively the kickoff finder could usage a specific bug, too multiple reports of the same Android põrnikas are fairly common. Instead, around participants chose to salvage their bugs for other contests that had lower prize amounts simply allowed user interaction, too lead maintain the opportunity that someone else mightiness written report them inward the meantime.

Prize Amount

It’s hard to decide the correct prize sum for this type of contest, too the fact that nosotros did non have whatever entries suggests that the prize sum mightiness lead maintain been likewise depression considering the type of bugs required to win this contest.
Overall, this competitor was a learning experience, too nosotros promise to lay what we’ve learned to usage inward Google’s rewards programs too time to come contests. Stay tuned!
Also, if at that spot were whatever aspects of the Prize that affected your participation that nosotros could improve, nosotros would similar to take away heed from you, either inward the comments, or at project-zero-prize@google.com.

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